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PUTTING POVERTY IN MUSEUMS: 
STRATEGIES TO ENCOURAGE THE 
CREATION OF THE FOR-PROFIT  
SOCIAL BUSINESS 
Leslie Dougherty*
Abstract: In Creating a World Without Poverty, Muhammad Yunus introduces 
the social business model which aims to provide a social benefit, not just a 
monetary profit. This model is distinct from a typical non-profit charity 
because investors expect to eventually recover their financial contribu-
tions to the social business. Yunus describes the Danone Communities 
mutual fund’s ability to protect the company from liability to sharehold-
ers for lack of a monetary profit while simultaneously providing food to 
malnourished children in Bangladesh. This Comment examines two dif-
ferent successful social business structures and argues that companies 
have yet to embrace this innovative model due to a lack of clear guide-
lines for this type of business in United States corporate law. The enact-
ment of mutual fund regulations encouraging the creation of this for-
profit sustainable social business would allow it to be very successful in re-
ducing poverty. 
Introduction 
I firmly believe that we can create a poverty-free world if we collectively believe 
in it. In a poverty-free world, the only place you would be able to see poverty is 
in the poverty museums. When school children take a tour of the poverty mu-
seums, they would be horrified to see the misery and indignity that some hu-
man beings had to go through. 
—Muhammad Yunus1
 The traditional capitalist business model is often criticized because 
of its over-emphasis on profit maximization.2 Even before the 2008 re-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 Muhammad Yunus, The Nobel Peace Prize 2006: Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006), in 
13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 267, 275 (2007). 
2 See, e.g., Martin Wolf, The Mortality of the Market, 138 Foreign Pol’y 47, 47 (explain-
ing that the market economy is criticized for its encouragement of greedy behavior which 
arguably results in global inequality); Sheridan Prasso, Saving the World with a Cup of Yogurt, 
Fortune, Feb. 19, 2007, at 98 (explaining Yunus’s belief that “[m]any of the problems in 
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cession, over thirty-seven million people in the United States were liv-
ing below the poverty line.3 Some argue that this is a direct result of 
business’ obsession with profits.4 Recognizing a social duty, various or-
ganizations are embracing a business model that focuses on a social 
benefit, instead of the wealth of a few.5 Thus, it is time to embrace a 
new model that works within the capitalist system, but also addresses 
the pitfalls of the standard business model which exacerbates poverty.6
 Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize and 
founder of Grameen Bank, introduces such a business model in his 
book, Creating a World Without Poverty.7 In 1976, Yunus established 
Grameen Bank with the goal of alleviating poverty by extending credit 
to the poor through microcredit financing.8 His belief that poverty is a 
threat to peace and human rights inspired him to pioneer this new type 
of banking.9 In 2000, world leaders pledged to reduce poverty by half 
by 2015; nonetheless, most observes do not believe this goal will be 
met.10 Yunus argues, however, that if the typical models of capitalist 
                                                                                                                      
the world remain unresolved because we continue to interpret capitalism too narrowly”); 
Asad Kamran Ghalib & Farhad Hossain, Social Business Enterprises—Maximising Social Benefits 
or Maximising Profits? The Case of Grameen-Danone Foods Limited 2 (Brooks World Poverty 
Inst., Working Paper No. 51, 2008) (on file with author) (stating that the capitalist model 
brings certain detrimental consequences along with its opportunities). 
3 Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, & Health Insurance Coverage 
in the U.S.: 2007, at 12 (2008). 
4 See, e.g., Frederic L. Pryor, The Future of U.S. Capitalism 82–111 (2002) (discuss-
ing capitalism’s role in the increasing income inequality in the United States); Prasso, supra 
note 2, at 98 (explaining Yunus’s view that poverty exists because of the focus on profitiabli-
lity and wealth in the current capitalist system); Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 3 (arguing 
that capitalism’s obsession with wealth has created economic inequality worldwide). 
5See Press Release, Grameen Health, Grameen Health to Establish Independent Collabo-
rations with Pfizer, GE Healthcare, and Mayo Clinic to Create Sustainable Healthcare Deliv-
ery Models for the Developing World (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://www.businesswire. 
com/portal/site/google/?ndmViewId=news_view&newsId=20080924005582&newsLang=en 
(announcing partnerships to create social businesses). 
6 Muhammad Yunus, Creating A World Without Poverty 21–40 (2007). 
7 See id.; Yunus, supra note 1, at 267. 
8 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 49; Hadley Rose, The Social Business: The Viability of a New 
Business Entity Type, 44 Willamette L. Rev. 131, 131 (2007). His bank has been self-reliant 
since 1995. Yunus, supra note 6, at 51. This can be attributed in part to the 98.5% payback 
rate. See id. 
9 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 268. Yunus believes that his Nobel Peace Prize proves the 
link between poverty and peace. Interview by Darren Gersh with Muhammad Yunus, 
Nightly Business Report (PBS television broadcast Nov. 20, 2006), available at www.pbs.org/ 
nbr/site/onair/transcripts/061120f/ [hereinafter Interview with Muhammad Yunus]. 
10 Yunus, supra note 6, at 4. The UN partially attributes this lack of progress to war and 
high food prices. See Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Millennium Development 
Goals Report 2008, at 6–9 (2008). Nonetheless, Bangladesh, where Yunus has focused his 
efforts, is on track to reduce poverty by half or more by 2015. See Yunus, supra note 6, at 4. 
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banking and business evolve to fit the social needs of society, this goal 
will be achieved.11
 Through Grameen, Yunus spearheaded the microcredit move-
ment, which provides small collateral-free loans to poor villagers.12 
Yunus founded the bank and began giving these loans primarily to 
poor women, which remains Grameen’s primary project.13 To ensure 
that it produces desired social results, each of these debtors is required 
to adhere to Grameen’s “Sixteen Decisions.”14 Although still offering 
these loans, Grameen has significantly evolved while maintaining its 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 48–52. Yunus argues that proper oversight can cause glob-
alization to help, not hinder, the alleviation of poverty. Yunus, supra note 1, at 273–74. 
12 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 268–69. Microcredit describes small, low-interest, collat-
eral-free loans that are given to the poor in order for them to start for-profit businesses. 
Yunus, supra note 6, at 68. 
13 Rose, supra note 8, at 131. These villagers are required to form small groups for 
support and help with business decisions. Yunus, supra note 6, at 57. Additionally, the 
Bank requires borrowers to attend weekly meetings where they handle repayments and 
applications and receive business guidance. Id. at 58. 
14 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 58–59. The Sixteen Decisions: 
1. The four principles of Grameen Bank—Discipline, Unity, Courage, and 
Hard Work—we shall follow and advance in all walks of our lives. 
2. We shall bring prosperity to our families. 
3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and 
work towards constructing new houses as soon as possible. 
4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them 
and sell the surplus. 
5. During the plantation season, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible. 
6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our expendi-
tures. We shall look after our health. 
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for 
their education. 
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean. 
9. We shall build and use pit latrines. 
10. We shall boil water before drinking or use alum to purify it. We shall use 
pitcher filters to remove arsenic. 
11. We shall not take any dowry at our sons’ weddings; neither shall we give 
any dowry in our daughters’ weddings. We shall keep the center free form the 
curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage. 
12. We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone; neither shall we allow anyone 
to do so. 
13. For higher income we shall collectively undertake bigger investments. 
14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in difficulty, we 
shall all help. 
15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any center, we shall all 
go there and help restore discipline. 
16. We shall take part in all social activities collectively. 
Id. at 58–59. While requiring adherence to the Sixteen Decisions may seem coercive, it has 
helped fulfill the goals of the bank and expand its social benefit. See id. at 58–60. 
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success; sixty-four percent of borrowers that have been with the bank 
for more than five years have emerged from poverty.15
 Yunus has expanded on his success with microcredit to explore 
how business can benefit society as a whole.16 The model of a social 
business, which Yunus focuses on in his book, is one which provides a 
social benefit, rather than just a monetary profit.17 In this model, the 
poor will not necessarily own the company, but a social benefit will arise 
from the nature of the business.18 Investors will not make a donation, 
nor will they financially profit.19 Instead, they will eventually recoup 
their initial investment.20 This allows any other profit to contribute to 
the expansion of the business to make it self-sustaining and increase 
the positive social results.21 Consequently, Yunus’s social business 
model is distinct from a charity because there is full cost recovery for 
investors.22 He argues that society will embrace these social businesses 
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See id. at 52. Grameen has adjusted to changing markets and current events. See id. at 
62–63, 65. It evolved from “Grameen I” to “Grameen II” as a result of large-scale loan de-
faults caused by the worst flood in Bangladesh history. See id. at 62–65. This involved a sig-
nificant increase in the amount of savings at Grameen Bank and an increase in flexibility 
with loans (such as more options with loan repayment). Id. at 62–63. First, the ordinary, 
income-generated loan terms (the original) is offered at twenty percent interest. Id. at 63. 
There is also an eight percent housing loan, and a student loan that has a zero percent 
interest rate during the study period and a five percent rate after degree completion. Id. at 
65. Finally, there is a “struggling member” loan that is granted to the very poorest mem-
bers, usually about fifteen dollars to carry small merchandise when they are begging. Id. 
Currently, Grameen loans to over seven million poor people in seventy-eight thousand 
villages in Bangladesh. Id. at 51. Additionally, ninety-seven percent of their borrowers are 
women. Id. Yunus claims that Grameen has achieved this success because he is not a 
trained banker, and thus thinks outside the normal constraints. See id. at 48, 77. Accord-
ingly, he built a system around the poor, instead of trying to fit them into the current one. 
See id. 
16See id. at 77–82. Grameen Bank has expanded into a twenty-five unrelated for profit 
and not-for-profit companies that all work toward the same mission of alleviating poverty. 
Id. at 78–80. The most recent of these companies is Grameen Danone, a model of the new 
social business theory. See id. at 79, 161–62. 
17 Id. at 28. He also introduces another social business model which is owned by the 
poor. See id. at 28. This creates a social benefit through its ownership because any profit 
gained will benefit those in need. Id. at 28–29. Grameen Bank is this second type of social 
business: ninety-four percent of its shares are owned by the borrowers, all of whom are 
below poverty level. Id. at 30. 
18 See id. at 28–29. 
19 See  Yunus, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
20 Id. at 22. 
21 See id. at 22–23. 
22 See id. at 22. For example, the mission of Yunus’s new Grameen Health program, “is 
to establish sustainable best practices in a broad range of health care services for a broad 
market including the poor.” Press Release, Grameen Health, New Venture Extending the 
Success of the Principles of Microcredit to Health Care Delivery and Medical Research 
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because most human beings are not only profit driven but are also mo-
tivated by their good-will and compassion.23 Therefore, social busi-
nesses are necessary in order to allow entrepreneurs to address all 
sources of motivation, such as poverty or the environment.24
 This social business model is distinct from all other current, com-
mon corporate philanthropic practices.25 It has a more specific mission 
than social entrepreneurship because the latter may include any “eco-
nomic or non-economic, for-profit or not-for-profit” initiative to help 
society.26 Additionally, social businesses are unlike the common prac-
tice of corporate social responsibility.27 Frequently, corporate social re-
sponsibility initiatives have some sort of financial benefit for the busi-
ness through the establishment of goodwill, as companies attract 
consumers and investors by demonstrating that they are providing a 
service to the community at large.28 Investors will choose to invest in a 
social business, however, as a result of its unique social benefits, not be-
cause of a potential profit.29
 In the United States, most corporations have yet to practice social 
businesses because of the flexible and unclear nature of corporate 
law.30 Although corporate law does not bar the creation of these types 
                                                                                                                      
Now Recruiting Staff, Volunteers, Advisors, and Partners (May 9, 2008) (on file with au-
thor) (emphasis added). 
23 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 37. According to Yunus, most of the world’s societal prob-
lems are caused by the restrictions on motivations in capitalist business, as they do not 
allow for any “political, emotional, social, spiritual, [or] environmental dimensions.” Yu-
nus, supra note 1, at 271. 
24 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 271; Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 2. 
25 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 16–17, 32–34. 
26 Id. at 32. 
27 See id. at 16–17. 
28 See id. at 16 (referring to corporate social responsibility as “mere window dressing”). 
Corporate social responsibility is viewed as good practice because “[i]t is an aspect of tak-
ing care of a company’s reputation, managing its risks and gaining a competitive edge.” Do 
It Right, Economist, Jan. 19, 2008, at 24. Moreover, corporations often practice the double 
or triple bottom line, through which they acquire a social benefit while still maximizing 
profits. See Yunus, supra note 6, at 170. According to Yunus, companies who practice it are 
either trying to satisfy corporate guilt or are attempting to create support and publicity for 
their company. Id. at 171. 
29 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 37–39. 
30 See Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without Handouts: 
The Google.org Experient in Philanthropy, 3 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 87, 93–95 (2008) (discussing the 
numerous potential challenges to the social business model); Jay Milbrandt, Comment, A 
New Form of Business Entity Is Needed to Promote Social Entrepreneurship: The Not-For-Loss Corpora-
tion, 1 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 421, 443–44 (2008) (explaining the various criticisms 
of the social business model as a result of corporate governance and regulatory issues, but 
noting that the barriers are not as imposing as they may seem). 
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of businesses, very few established companies have created them.31 This 
innovative business model could have a widespread, positive effect on 
communities affected by poverty.32 The hesitancy, however, has pre-
vented the self-sustaining social business model from thriving.33
 This Comment will examine Yunus’s social business model and the 
hesitancy of companies to adopt it. Part I will provide a detailed ac-
count of Yunus’s first social business and its social objective, business 
model, structure, and current success. Part II will show how the flexibil-
ity in corporate law in the United States has made the social business 
model less attractive for companies. Specifically, it will examine the cur-
rent state of directors’ liability to shareholders for duty of care and duty 
of loyalty claims and how the lack of social businesses results from the 
absence of clear standards or guidelines for this type of business in cor-
porate law. Furthermore, Part III will discuss two successful examples of 
social businesses and how they are structured in response to the flexi-
bility of corporate law in this area. Finally, Part IV will advocate for clear 
mutual fund regulations to encourage the creation of this type of busi-
ness. The for-profit sustainable social business could be very successful 
at eliminating poverty; however, clear, practical guidelines are necessary 
before they will be successful on a grand scale.34
I. Grameen Danone: A Social Business Experiment 
A. Grameen Danone’s Mission 
 As a result of poverty, Bangladeshi children do not have access to 
sufficient nutrition.35 Recognizing this problem, Yunus’s first attempts 
to implement the social business model came in the form of Grameen 
Danone, whose mission is “to bring daily healthy nutrition to low in-
come, nutritionally deprived populations in Bangladesh and alleviate 
poverty through the implementation of a unique proximity business 
                                                                                                                      
31See Janet Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business 
Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 623, 667–68 (2007); Milbrandt, supra note 30, at 443–44. 
32 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 268. 
33 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 667; Milbrandt, supra note 30, at 429; Katie Hafner, Philan-
thropy Google’s Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2006, at A1 (explaining that there 
are many skeptics of the unique nature of the social business model). 
34 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 274–75. 
35 See UNICEF, Bangladesh Statistics, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bangla- 
desh_bangladesh_statistics.html#44 (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). Forty-eight percent of chil-
dren under five in Bangladesh are moderately to severely underweight. Id. Moreover, forty-
three percent suffer from moderate to severe stunting. Id. 
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model.”36 This joint venture between Grameen Bank and Groupe Da-
none is not a corporate social responsibility project because it is not “a 
project of a profit-maximizing business with a charitable veneer.”37 In-
stead, it is a social business with the specific social objective of providing 
Bangladeshi children access to nutritious yogurt on a daily basis.38 The 
business maintains its financial viability in order to create new oppor-
tunities for the poor, while still selling its yogurt at a very low price for 
accessibility.39 Additionally, to adhere to the social business model, 
Grameen Danone operates under a “proximity business model,” which 
eliminates the chain of distribution as a result of local manufacturing 
and consequently promotes employment in the region.40 Accordingly, 
Groupe Danone’s CEO and Yunus opted to build a small localized fac-
tory because of the social benefits for the local community.41
 In order to maximize the social benefit, any profit beyond the cost 
of capital will be reinvested to allow for an expansion of the social 
benefit, a plan consistent with Yunus’s model.42 Moreover, Groupe Da-
none will supply half of the initial $1.1 million funding and reinvest 
almost all of the profits to expand the social benefit.43 It predicts a two 
                                                                                                                      
36 Press Release, Groupe Danone, Launching of Grameen Danone Foods Social Busi-
ness Enterprise (Mar. 16, 2006) (on file with author); see Yunus, supra note 1, at 273. Mal-
nutrition and poverty contribute to each other: “[P]overty brings with it severe health con-
sequences, trapping the poor into a vicious cycle of sickness . . . [h]igh costs of health 
services make the poor even poorer.” Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 8. 
37 Yunus, supra note 6, at 145. Groupe Danone and Grameen Bank partnered to create 
this social business. See Groupe Danone, supra note 36 (“The Grameen Group and Groupe 
Danone entered into a 50–50 joint venture agreement effective March 16, 2006, to form a 
company called the Grameen Danone Foods Social Business Enterprise in Bangladesh.”). 
38 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 144. Grameen Danone’s Memorandum of Understanding 
specifically states that it will “help children of Bangladesh grow strong, thanks to tasty, nu-
tritious food and beverage products they can consume every day, so that they can have a 
better future.” Id. (quoting Grameen Danone’s Memorandum of Understanding). 
39 See id.; Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 12. 
40 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 133 (noting that the yogurt would be sold in neighbor-
hoods within less than forty-eight hours of its production, thus eliminating costs of ship-
ping and refrigeration). 
41 See id. at 139. Depending on the success of this first small factory, Grameen Danone 
plans to construct up to fifty similar factories throughout Bangladesh. Id. The first small 
plant was constructed in Bogra and received its supplies from the surrounding area. Id. at 
139–40, 157. Also, all employees of the factory are local villagers and the yogurt is distrib-
uted by Bangladeshi women in various villages. Id. at 149, 151, 152, 157. As a result of the 
local distribution model, Danone entrusts all of the management to the local factory. Rose, 
supra note 8, at 151. 
42 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 172–73. 
43 Id. at 144. 
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to three percent rate of return on its investment, leaving some doubt as 
to whether investors will receive any return from this business.44
B. Groupe Danone’s Social Business Mutual Fund 
 Groupe Danone’s CEO recognized the contradiction between this 
lack of return to shareholders and Groupe Danone’s profit-maximiz-
ation purpose.45 He was faced with a question of how to adhere to the 
stated purpose of Danone while also investing in a social business.46 Ac-
cordingly, the Groupe Danone board of directors decided to legally 
separate Grameen Danone from Groupe Danone and create an “auton-
omous entity with its own specific shareholders” instead of a hybrid 
business model.47 This would solve the shareholder problem while still 
providing for a small monetary profit for Groupe Danone.48
 To create this entity, Groupe Danone created a mutual fund with a 
specific social mission and gave shareholders the option to join it.49 
Thus, Groupe Danone can clearly explain to investors that the fund 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id.; Interview by Danone Communities with Emmanuel Faber, Executive Vice-
President, Groupe Danone (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.danonecommunities. 
com./?p=157 [hereinafter Interview with Emmanuel Faber]. In Yunus’s ideal model, any 
return on an investment would go towards the growth of the social business. See Yunus, 
supra note 6, at 22. This one percent dividend shows Danone’s partial ownership of 
Grameen Danone through the figure on its balance sheet. See id. In response to a question 
about this dividend, Danone’s Executive Vice-President stated that “[t]he one thing that is 
very clear is that the societal objective of all these projects supersedes any other objective.” 
Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra. 
45 See Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. Specifically, Groupe Danone’s 
Articles of Association do not set out any social objective. See Groupe Danone, Articles 
of Association Art. 2, available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/95/ 
95168/cg/Statuts_5MAI2008_en.pdf. 
 The purpose of the company, whether directly or indirectly, shall be: 
Industry and trade relating to all food products; 
The performance of all and any financial transactions and the management 
of all and any transferable rights and securities, listed or unlisted, French or 
foreign, the acquisition and the management of all and any real estate prop-
erties and rights. 
Id. 
46 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 169–70. Danone’s Executive Vice-President stated that he 
was forced to grapple with the question: “[To] what extent do I have the shareholders’ 
mandate to invest, to involve myself or to let my company get involved in civil society?” 
Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
47 Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
48 Id.; see Yunus, supra note 6, at 170–71. 
49 Yunus, supra note 6, at 171. The title of the mutual fund is Société d’Investissement 
à Capital Variable, SICAV danone communities. Id. 
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only has a social benefit and no monetary dividends.50 To invest in the 
Danone Communities Fund (“Danone Communities”), Groupe Da-
none investors opt to receive a “social dividend,” which gives them 
shares in the fund, instead of a cash dividend from Groupe Danone.51 
In this model, the pure social benefit and the lack of monetary return 
are immediately clear to shareholders.52 Ninety percent of funds in 
Danone Communities will be invested in money market instruments 
and ten percent will be invested in social businesses, which provide no 
return.53 Through this method, Danone Communities shareholders 
will have a near market yield on their investment and consequently 
have the capacity to support a number of social businesses.54
 This new fund is popular because of its unique model and has pro-
tected the company from liability, as well as created a new role for the 
banker because of its social focus.55 Even though Yunus and the Execu-
tive Vice-President of Danone were concerned about this new and 
unique concept being approved by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and its French equivalent, Autorité des Marchés Financi-
ers (AMF), it was classified as a “social business development fund” and 
listed on both the French and U.S. financial markets.56 Danone Com-
munities is underwritten and managed by a leading French bank, Crédit 
Agricole, and over thirty percent of Groupe Danone’s employees have 
opted to partially invest in it.57 Additionally, by creating this separate 
mutual fund, Groupe Danone is protected from shareholders who do 
not believe that this social benefit fulfills the purpose of the company.58 
                                                                                                                      
50 See id. at 171–72; Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 3. The Executive Vice-President 
describes this as saying to shareholders: “We propose, if you like, that you invest all or some 
of your dividend for a social and societal mission that is closely interlinked with the com-
pany’s processes.” Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
51 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 172. 
52 See id. at 171–72. The Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 
1933 require funds to have a prospectus to make their purpose clear to investors. See 15 
U.S.C. § 77j(a) (2006); id. § 80a–24. Thus Danone Communities fulfilled this regulation by 
specifying this social benefit. See Yunus, supra note 6, at 171–72. 
53 Yunus, supra note 6, at 171. 
54 See id. 
55 See id.; Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44 (explaining that Danone 
Communities needed to be a separate entity from Groupe Danone because of its share-
holders). 
56 Yunus, supra note 6, at 172–73; Groupe Danone, Form 6–K Report of Foreign Pri-
vate Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a–16 or 15d–16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Mar. 16, 2006). 
57 Yunus, supra note 6, at 173. 
58 See Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
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Thus, Groupe Danone created this mutual fund to adhere to its original 
business purpose while still working towards eliminating poverty.59
II. Social Businesses and Potential Liability 
 Most companies considering creating a social business have the 
same hesitancy as Groupe Danone.60 Thus, while social businesses are 
not necessarily barred by law, they are not as popular as not-for-profit 
charities because of the unclear and flexible nature of corporate law.61 
This flexibility protects directors that believe their decisions are in the 
best interest of their business.62 However, a lack of clear corporate law 
standards also causes directors to adhere to traditional business models 
and avoid new ideas, such as social businesses.63
A. Business Judgment Rule Protection 
  Although directors are nervous about possible duty of care liabil-
ity because of the lack of a clear social business model, United States 
courts generally remove themselves from business decisions.64 Conse-
                                                                                                                      
 
59 See Yunus, supra note 1, at 275; Prasso, supra note 2, at 101. 
60 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 31, at 667 (explaining the misconception that “current laws 
do not protect socially outward looking decisions”); Ghalib & Hossain, supra note 2, at 12 
(stating that “[d]oubts were raised as to how long [Grameen Danone] would be able to 
run operations ‘for social benefit’ alone, without reaping maximum profits”); Interview 
with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44 (discussing Danone’s fear of not adhering to its busi-
ness purpose). 
61 See Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road For-
ward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 346 (2007) 
(explaining that despite the recent interest in the social business, very few commentators 
have proposed solutions to current regulations to allow for this type of business). 
62 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 636. 
63 See Gottesman, supra note 61, at 346, 351–58 (explaining the lack of models or regu-
lations for this type of business model to follow). 
64 See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–11 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Yunus, su-
pra note 6, at 169–70; Gottesman, supra note 61, at 350–51. The duty of care claim ensures 
that “directors exercise the care that a person in a like position would exercise under simi-
lar circumstances.” See Denis J. Block et al., 1 The Business Judgment Rule 109 (5th 
ed. 2005). Courts, however, generally adhere to the principle that “[t]he director’s room 
rather that the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business ques-
tions which will have an impact on profits, market prices, competitive situations, or tax 
advantages.” Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810–11; see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“The redress for 
failures that arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through the 
action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court.”). The ration-
ale behind this principle follows that “[s]hould the [c]ourt apportion liability based on the 
ultimate outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those 
decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value 
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quently, directors and boards have a significant amount of flexibility in 
their decision making process.65 This principle is indoctrinated in the 
business judgment rule, which represents “a presumption that in mak-
ing a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”66 It helps to ensure that 
directors maintain a business-centric attitude and adhere to a deliber-
ate decision making process.67 Thus, the established standard to receive 
relief under a business judgment rule claim is gross negligence, making 
liability for duty of care very infrequent.68
 Directors who desire to create a social business will therefore be 
protected by the business judgment rule as long as they are informed in 
their decision making process.69 This rule only asks if there was a proper 
procedure followed to reach the decision and does not evaluate the de-
cision itself.70 The business judgment rule furthers the policy of leaving 
business decisions in the boardroom.71 Thus, the concern of liability for 
a social business as a result of a breach of the director’s duty of care is 
unfounded unless there is some sort of gross negligence.72 Although the 
                                                                                                                      
. . . . [T]he Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for share-
holders and society alike.” Disney, 907 A.2d at 698. 
65 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810–12; Kerr, supra note 31, at 635–39 (explaining that di-
rectors have significant independence in their decisions, despite the traditional director 
duties). Additionally, this flexibility is important because shareholder derivatives suits 
against directors’ judgment are timely and pricey. See Greenbaum v. American Metal Cli-
max, 278 N.Y.S.2d 123, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1967). As a result, “[shareholders] are required to set 
forth something more than vague general charges of wrongdoing . . . conclusory allega-
tions of breaches of fiduciary duty are not enough.” Id. at 130–31. 
66 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (establishing this presumption as 
the business judgment rule in Delaware common law). “Questions of policy of manage-
ment. . . . are left solely to [directors’] honest and unselfish decisions, for their powers 
therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of them for the 
common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the 
results show that what they did was unwise or inexpedient.” Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 100 
N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912). As a result of the business judgment rule, to establish liability 
for a breach of duty of care, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption that the direc-
tors acted with due care and then the burden will shift to the directors to prove they acted 
in an informed manner. Block, supra note 64, at 110–11. 
67 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (reaffirming the busi-
ness judgment rule). Although the Van Gorkom decision has been criticized, the decision 
still demonstrates the limits on court intervention in the board room. See Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 947 (Del. 2003) (Steele, J., dissenting). 
68 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873; Arnoson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
69 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872, 873; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
70 Block, supra note 64, at 21–22. 
71 See Pollitz, 100 N.E. at 724; Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 810–11. 
72 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. 
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business judgment rule protects directors in their informed decisions, 
because of the lack of clear guidelines, directors are still nervous to stray 
from the traditional model, especially one that attempts to change the 
focus of the business away from its profit-making mission.73
B. The Business Purpose Question 
 While the business judgment rule can protect the directors from a 
duty of care violation, it will not protect them from liability in a duty of 
loyalty breach if they were not acting in the best interest of their share-
holders—consequently, directors may hesitate to put capital towards 
the creation of social businesses.74 Business decisions are still rarely sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny as long as the corporation is “managed by its 
directors pursuant to a free, honest exercise of judgment uninfluenced 
by personal, or by any considerations other than the welfare of the cor-
poration.”75 This duty of loyalty is regarded as one of the paramount 
responsibilities of directors, and therefore courts give it great consid-
eration.76 However, in order to allow a director to make independent 
decisions, claims are only viable against a board of directors if fraud, 
dishonesty, bad faith, or self-interest are involved in the director’s deci-
sion, as well as any neglect of corporate duties.77
 To determine whether a board might be liable for the creation of a 
social business under this standard, the (generally unclear) established 
purpose of a corporation is an essential consideration.78 A.P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow established the common law treatment of 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Gottesman, supra note 61, at 350–51. 
74 See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View 
of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 299, 303 (1993); Interview with Emmanuel Faber, 
supra note 44. The duty of loyalty “is designed ‘to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid 
the temptation of self–interest.’” Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (quoting In re Ryan’s Will, 52 
N.E.2d 909, 923 (N.Y. 1943)). 
75 See Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
76 See id. at 5–7. 
77 See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 720(a)(1)(A)–(B) (McKinney 2003); Higgins v. N.Y. Stock 
Exch., Inc., 806 N.Y.S.2d 339, 357–58 (Sup. Ct. 2005). For example, New York’s law states 
that a director may be liable for actions if there was neglect or a failure to perform. See N.Y. 
Bus. Corp. Law § 720(a)(1)(A)–(B). The neglect used in duty of loyalty claims is not poor 
judgment in a business decision, but rather a neglect of a director’s duties, as set out in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation. See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. There will some-
times be disagreement with director decisions but that does not mean that it is actionable 
neglect. See id. 
78 See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583–85 (N.J. 1953); Milbrandt, supra 
note 30, at 435–37 (discussing the possible business purpose challenges to the for-profit 
social business model). 
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philanthropy in the overall purpose of a corporation.79 Generally, pri-
vate profit is established to be the main objective of a corporation; thus, 
in the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, directors could not 
use corporate funds for a philanthropic purpose unless it there was a 
resulting benefit for the corporation.80 Nevertheless, as a result of the 
aggregation of wealth within corporations, corporations, not individuals, 
can have the most significant effect on charities.81 Therefore, corporate 
participation in philanthropic work is encouraged and usually viewed as 
furthering a business purpose because of the amount of public support 
it helps create.82 Additionally, the purpose of the corporation is gener-
ally established in its articles of incorporation and thus can be altered by 
the corporation, underscoring the flexibility of business purposes.83
                                                                                                                      
79 See Barlow, 98 A.2d at 583–86; Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving, 44 
DePaul Law Rev. 1, 26–27 (1994). Originally, the intent of all corporations was considered 
to be for the benefit of the public and government. Barlow, 98 A.2d at 583. 
80 See Barlow, 98 A.2d at 583–84, 586–87; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the 
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 830 (2005). This assumption did not harm charities in 
the nineteenth century because a very small amount of wealth was held by corporations. 
Barlow, 98 A.2d at 585–86. The only powers that a corporation held in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century were those that the state and its articles of incorporation granted. 
See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 579, 594–95 (1997). 
81 See Barlow, 98 A.2d at 584, 585–86. As a result of lucrative tax incentives for corpora-
tions, some consider it more beneficial for a corporation to make philanthropic donations 
rather than individual stockholders after the corporation has been taxed. See R. Franklin 
Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by 
Corporations, 54 Bus. Law. 965, 991 (1999). Additionally, some argue that corporations are 
better suited to make these donations; this solves a collective action problem and corpora-
tions are in a better position to monitor the use of the contribution. See Elhauge, supra 
note 80, at 830–40. 
82 See Barlow, 98 A.2d at 584. The benefits of corporate philanthropy are numerous, in-
cluding forming a positive image for the corporation. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 81, at 
967; Knauer, supra note 79, at 29–30, 53–60. Additionally, even if a philanthropic contribu-
tion or venture cannot easily be linked to a business benefit, virtually all are justified that way. 
See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 80, at 968. The public attitude in favor of a charitable corpo-
ration may “not be measured in accounting terms, but it apparently counts to legitimize the 
donation and to distinguish it from a gift for which absolutely nothing is received that would 
be unauthorized unless approved unanimously by the stockholders.” Victor Brudney & Allen 
Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1191, 1193–94 (2002). 
83 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 202(b)(1)(i) (West 1990) (stating that “[t]he purpose of 
the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may be 
organized”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 101(b), 102(a)(3) (1974) (stating that the purpose 
of the corporation must be stated in the articles of incorporation and that the purpose 
may be any lawful activity); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 201(a) (McKinney 2003) (explaining 
that “[a] corporation may be formed . . . for any lawful business purpose or purposes ex-
cept to do in this state any business for which formation is permitted under any other stat-
ute of this state”); Consolidated Film Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 197 A. 489, 493 (Del. 1937) 
(explaining that a company’s articles of incorporation may be amended). 
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 As a result of this shift in the common law, many states have codi-
fied the right of business directors to contribute to philanthropic 
causes.84 For example, Delaware General Corporation Law section 122 
allows directors to “[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for 
charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in times of war or 
other national emergency in aid thereof.”85 This is listed among the 
powers of corporations, all of which are authorized in order for corpo-
rations to meet their ultimate goal, the maximization of profit.86 Like-
wise, California Corporations Code section 207(e) authorizes philan-
thropic contribution, “regardless of specific corporate benefit.”87 The 
statute still maintains, however, a relation to maximizing profit.88 While 
common law and statutory law both recognize the right of charitable 
giving, directors still strive to have some justification that they are fur-
thering the purpose of the business.89
                                                                                                                      
84 See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 3.02(13) (2007) (granting corporations the 
power “to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable . . . purposes”); Cal. 
Corp. Code § 207(e) (West 1990) (granting corporations the power to “[m]ake donations, 
regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund, 
hospital, charitable . . . purposes”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(9) (granting corporations 
the power to “[m]ake donations for the public welfare”); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 202(12) 
(McKinney 2003) (granting corporations the power, “[t]o make donations, irrespective of 
corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund, hospital, charitable . . . or 
similar purposes”); Elhauge, supra note 80, at 830 (explaining that states reacted to the 
common law change in corporate law by creating charitable contribution statutes). These 
statutes give significant discretionary power to directors in terms of the company’s charita-
ble actions. See Kahn, supra note 80, at 602–05. Some argue that the state of the law is too 
flexible, allowing whatever a director’s whim may be. Id. A consequence of this lack of 
clear regulations is that directors may be unclear about the state of the law in regard to 
unique business models. Kerr, supra note 31, at 637; Rana, supra note 30, at 93–95. 
85 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 122(9). 
86 See id. In Delaware, a corporation may “promote any lawful business or purposes.” 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 101(b). This business or purpose must be specified in the articles 
of incorporation and is generally considered to exist for the benefit of stockholders. See id. 
§ 102(a)(3); Gottesman, supra note 61, at 350–51. Thus, all the powers of the corporation 
must be considered within the scope of the corporation’s purpose. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 
8 § 121(a). 
87 Cal. Corp. Code § 207(e) (West 1990). California common law recognizes the 
broader social obligation of charitable contribution. See Memorial Hosp. Ass’n v. Pacific 
Grape Prods. Co., 290 P.2d 481, 483 (Cal. 1955). This goodwill to the community can sig-
nificantly benefit the business through positive public relations. See Memorial Hosp. Ass’n, 
290 P.2d at 483; Knauer, supra note 79, at 72–73. 
88 See Cal. Corp. Code § 207(e) (West 1990). This part of the Code begins: “[s]ubject 
to any limitations contained in the articles and to compliance with other provisions of this 
division and any other applicable laws . . . .” Id. 
89 See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 81, at 968, 991. 
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 Additionally, it is unclear to what extent directors may consider 
others over the company’s shareholders.90 The Michigan Supreme 
Court decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. established the rule that busi-
nesses cannot be run primarily for the benefit of others and that all de-
cisions are to be made with the shareholders in mind.91 Nonetheless, in 
Illinois, the Schlensky v. Wrigley decision determined that directors may 
consider others besides shareholders when making a decision, as long 
as the shareholders’ benefit is still of foremost importance.92 In Schlen-
sky, the directors may have considered the effect on the surrounding 
neighborhood, but that did not preclude them from also considering 
the benefit for or detriment of the shareholders.93 As a result of this 
lack of clear guidelines, a corporation will often show, unlike in Yunus’s 
model, that there is also a business purpose if it is aiming for a social 
result.94 This demonstrates that the directors consider their share-
holder’s benefit along with those who benefit from the social result (for 
example, Bangladeshi children).95
III. Reactions to Corporate Law Uncertainty 
 Although corporate law affords significant flexibility to directors, its 
uncertain nature may cause some companies to reject Yunus’s unique 
idea.96 Nevertheless, Grameen Danone and another corporation, 
                                                                                                                      
90 Compare Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (forbidding the 
consideration of the benefits of employees and the general public over those of the share-
holders), and Gottesman, supra note 61, at 350, with Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 760, 
780 (Ill. App. 2d 1968) (allowing the consideration of the welfare of the general public in 
the business decision). 
91 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682–85; Knauer, supra note 79, at 24–26. The Court stated that 
Ford Motor Company was able to take care of its own affairs; however it did not allow di-
rectors to keep profits from shareholders. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682. 
92 See Schlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. This case is distinguished from Dodge v. Ford because 
there was fraud or breach of good faith in the Dodge case in the eyes of the court. See id. at 
779–80. Thus, there only needed to be a connection between the decision and share-
holder’s interest. See id. 
93 See id. at 780. This was a dispute over installing lights for night games at Wrigley 
Field; most ballparks had already installed the lights. See id. at 777–78, 780. However, the 
owner of Chicago Cubs chose not to because it would adversely affect the neighborhood, 
among other reasons. See Schlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777–78, 780. 
94 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 170–71; Balotti & Hanks, supra note 81, at 968. 
95 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 171–72. Thus, corporate giving currently requires that di-
rectors act in what they, “reasonably believe is the corporation’s best interests . . . based on 
the traditional profit-maximization theory of corporate purpose.” Balotti & Hanks, supra 
note 81, at 980. 
96 See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 81, at 968 (explaining that the uncertain nature of 
charitable contribution and fear of angry shareholders results in the veiling of philan-
thropy as a business purpose). 
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Google, have embraced the social business model.97 Each reacted to the 
potential liability in different ways: Google by embracing the flexibility 
of the business purpose, and Groupe Danone by creating a completely 
separate legal entity.98
A. Google.org as an Anomaly 
 Google’s social business, Google.org, is not legally separated from 
its parent company, but is structured to eliminate the uncertainties of 
corporate law.99 Google.org defines itself as “a hybrid philanthropy that 
uses a range of approaches to help advance solutions within . . . five ini-
tiatives.”100 Like Yunus’s model of a social business, Google.org is a for-
profit business.101 Although Google provided the start-up capital for 
Google.org, it is not worried about angering shareholders because its 
founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin clearly stated the company’s mis-
sion of a social benefit in its infancy.102 In order to give Google.org the 
necessary start-up capital, Google contributed one percent of its equity 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 144–45; Google.org, About Us, http://www.google.org/ 
about.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter About Google.org]. Google is a corpora-
tion under Delaware law. See Google Inc., Third Amended and Restated Certificate of 
Incorporation 2 (2004), available at http://investor.google.com/charter.html. It maintains 
a number of Web sites, most notably the search engine, www.google.com. Google Inc., Cor-
porate Information, www.google.com/corporate (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The company 
became publicly held in 2004. Google Inc., Investor FAQ’s, http://investor.google.com/faq. 
html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
98 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 628; Rana, supra note 30, at 87–88; Interview with Em-
manuel Faber, supra note 44. 
99 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 628; Hafner, supra note 33. Hafner’s article explains 
Google.org’s unique business model. See Hafner, supra note 33, at A1, C4. 
100 About Google.org, supra note 97. These five initiatives are to: “1) develop renew-
able energy cheaper than coal, 2)rechargeIT [to accelerate the adoption of plug-in electric 
vehicles], 3) predict and prevent [emerging infectious diseases and environmental disas-
ters], 4) inform and empower to improve public services, and 5) fuel the growth of small 
and medium-sized enterprises.” Google.org Homepage, http://www.google.org (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2009). These initiatives are more than charitable causes, they are meant to 
support economies of scale in the future. Milbrandt, supra note 30, at 427. 
101 See Milbrandt, supra note 30, 427–28; Hafner, supra note 33. Google founders Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin felt too constrained by the requirements of a 501(c)(3) foundation. 
Hafner, supra note 33, at C4. Google.org’s executive director noted that “Google.org can 
play on the entire keyboard. . . . It can start companies, build industries, pay consultants, 
lobby, give money to individuals and make a profit.” Hafner, supra note 33. Page and Brin 
believe this flexibility will significantly benefit their corporation’s reach because it essen-
tially eliminates all possible limitations that would apply if it was a not-for-profit. See Rana, 
supra note 30, at 93–94. 
102See Kerr, supra note 31, at 627; About Google.org, supra note 97. 
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and profits.103 The main objective of this contribution was to produce 
social results.104 Some shareholders could disagree with the use of capi-
tal for a social purpose because Google pays no shareholder dividends 
at this time.105
 Google is an anomaly because it took advantage of the flexibility of 
corporate law by making its mission of working towards a social benefit 
clear in its infancy.106 Before its initial public offering, Page and Brin 
clearly set out their commitment to philanthropic work through di-
rectly stating their plans to put one percent stock and equal percentage 
of profit towards social issues.107 In its initial public offering letter, they 
also brought attention to Google’s well-known motto “don’t be evil.”108 
Establishing this unique goal as a priority in the infancy of the company 
not only made Google an anomaly, but also protected it from disgrun-
tled shareholders because social benefits are an established purpose of 
the company.109
                                                                                                                      
 
103See About Google.org, supra note 97. This capital, which originated from seed 
money from the Google Initial Public Offering, amounted to over one billion dollars. Kerr, 
supra note 31, at 627. Additionally, Google has supplied Google.org with its employees and 
various other resources. See About Google.org, supra note 97. 
104 See Hafner, supra note 33, at A1. The executive director of Google.org noted, 
“[w]e’re not doing it for the profit. And if we didn’t get our capital back, so what? The 
emphasis is on social returns, not economic returns.” Id. Thus, like Yunus’s model of social 
business, all of the emphasis in Google.org is on the social benefit. See id. The issue is how 
to describe a profit here because it would not be monetary. See Rana, supra note 30, at 94. 
105 See Rana, supra note 30, 94–95; Milbrandt, supra note 30, 428; Hafner, supra note 33. 
106 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 627–28. The creation of this philanthropy is early in com-
parison to most companies, such as Microsoft and it’s not-for-profit foundation, the Gates 
Foundation. See Kerr, supra note 31, at 628; Hafner, supra note 33. Gottesman discusses an 
idea, similar to Yunus’s, of B corporations which are traditional corporations but spell out 
their social commitments in their governing documents to give investors notice. Gottes-
man, supra note 61, at 355. 
107 Google Inc., Initial Public Offering Letter (Form S-1/A), at 32 (Aug. 18, 2004) 
[hereinafter IPO Letter]; Rana, supra note 30, at 87. 
108See IPO Letter, supra note 107, at 32. Brin and Page use the “don’t be evil” motto to 
describe their attitude that Google and its shareholders, “will be better served . . . by a 
company that does good things for the world even if we forgo some short term gains.” Id. 
This motto runs through everything Google does; for example, the Google Code of Con-
duct is structured around it. See Google, Inc., Code of Conduct, http://investor.google. 
com/conduct.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). Additionally, the motto is one of the identify-
ing and popular characteristics of Google in the public mind. See Adam Lashinsky, Can Google 
Three-Peat?, Cnn.com, Jan. 31, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/28/news/companies/ 
google.qa.fortune/index.htm. 
109 See Rana, supra note 30, at 94–95 (“Google’s founders informed potential investors 
of their plans to devote a certain amount of funds to a philanthropic entity before taking 
the company public, so the investors have little basis to complain now that the founders 
are ‘robbing’ them by doing so.”). Additionally, if necessary, Google could argue that there 
is a business purpose to this social business because it is well publicized and makes the 
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B. Danone’s Separate Legal Entity Model 
 While Google.org finds solace in the flexibility of corporate law, this 
lack of clarity causes other companies to shy away from creating these 
businesses.110 Since Danone did not establish a social goal in its infancy 
like Google, its foremost concern when its CEO decided to become in-
volved in a social business was the company’s liability to the sharehold-
ers for not following the stated purposes of the company.111 Most com-
panies, notably those with the most significant amount of capital to 
contribute, will be similar to Danone and will not have established a so-
cial purpose in their infancies.112 Thus, directors of a corporation estab-
lished for profit maximization may also be liable to shareholders be-
cause the lack of dividends could suggest that the shareholders’ benefit 
is not of the foremost importance.113 Companies that desire to establish 
or contribute to social businesses and have not established this in their 
articles of incorporation will want to protect themselves from the risk of 
liability.114 They could take remedial steps, such as amending their char-
ter; however, these may detract from the appeal of investing in the com-
pany.115 Therefore, these companies must find some way, like Danone, 
to separate this social business from their original business.116
                                                                                                                      
company more attractive to consumers. See Milbrandt, supra note 30, at 437; Hafner, supra 
note 33. This distinguishes Google.org from Yunus’s model because he advocates a purely 
social purpose with no general business purpose for the company whatsoever. See Yunus, 
supra note 6, at 170–71. 
110 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 628; cf. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountabil-
ity, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 227–242 (2003) (discussing the significant amount of flexibility for 
directors regarding charitable contributions). 
111 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 169–70. The main question for Danone was: “How do we 
defend ourselves when the shareholders ask, ‘How dare you invest our money in a project 
that creates no profit for us? You are violating your mandate in doing so.’” See id. at 170. 
112 See Hafner, supra note 33. 
113 See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 587 (N.J. 1953) (explaining the 
power of corporations to give to philanthropies while remaining true to their sharehold-
ers); Kerr, supra note 31, at 636–37 (discussing the current unclear state of the corporate 
fiduciary duty). 
114 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 169–70. 
115 See Steen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 129 N.E. 546, 549 (Ill. 1921) (establishing 
the right of those who make bylaws to amend them). This could detract from the appeal of 
a company to potential investors if they are interested only in the company’s original 
profit–maximization purpose. Yunus, supra note 6, at 39–40. 
116 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 170–71. 
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IV. Encouraging Social Businesses Through the  
Mutual Fund Model 
 To encourage the creation of these social businesses and to ad-
dress the uncertainty in corporate law, the United States should create 
incentives or guidelines for their formation.117 Specifically, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) should enact mutual fund regu-
lations modeled after Danone Communities Social Investment Fund 
given its success and popularity with investors.118 Because this is such a 
new type of business, there are not any other models, but most 
Grameen social businesses will likely be similar to the Danone mutual 
fund model.119 However, like corporate law, mutual fund regulations 
are currently unclear on the subject because while they would allow for 
social mutual funds, regulations do not specify how such funds would 
differ from the typical mutual fund which has profit as its goal.120 The 
goal of mutual fund regulations is, “to provide full and fair disclosure of 
the character of securities sold . . . and to prevent frauds in the sale 
thereof.”121 Therefore, to help social investment companies meet this 
goal, the SEC should set guidelines on how to properly disclose a social 
purpose.122
A. The Mutual Fund Model 
 Generally, there are no bars to expansion or creation of new in-
vestment funds; therefore, as long as a social mutual fund follows SEC 
registration guidelines, it will not be barred because of its philanthropic 
goal.123 Currently, a mutual fund must register with the SEC under the 
                                                                                                                      
 
117 See, e.g., id. (advocating for specific social business regulations); Brudney & Ferrell, 
supra note 82, at 1210 (arguing that a program of shareholder choice would have to be 
implemented at the federal level, not state level); Gottesman, supra note 61, at 351–54 
(explaining the arguments that legislation for new corporate forms or new tax laws are 
necessary for the not-for-loss corporation). 
118 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 172–73. 
119 See E-mail from Shadab Mahmud, Program Manager, Graeme Health, to author 
(Oct. 11, 2008, 11:59:00 EST) (on file with author). 
120 See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006); id. § 80a–24(a); Yunus, supra note 6, at 171–72. 
121 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Searchlight Consol. Min. & Mill. Co., 112 F. Supp. 726, 
729 (D.C. 1953); Gordon J. Alexander et al., Mutual Fund Shareholders: Characteristics, Inves-
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per No. 97–13), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/workpaper/wp97-13.pdf. 
122 See Searchlight, 112 F. Supp. at 729. 
123 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 171–73 (discussing the creation of Danone Communities as 
a social business developement fund); John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in 
the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. Corp. L. 151, 168–69 (2007) 
(noting that the absence of the barriers to new funds creates competition in the industry); 
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Investment Company Act of 1940 and its issued securities under the 
Securities Act of 1933 by filing Form N-1A.124 This form has three spe-
cific parts to guide the investment company in disclosing the proper 
information to investors.125 A prospectus is required to ensure that 
shareholders make informed decisions on their investments.126 Addi-
tionally, the investment company must include the fund’s investment 
objective goals and a summary of how it intends to achieve them.127 
Thus, mutual funds must ensure that the information in its registration 
statement meets the requirements of section 10(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933 so they are not liable for a materially misleading or false state-
ment on its prospectus.128
 To clarify the current regulations for businesses with a social pur-
pose, there must be clear guidelines or new regulations for how to 
properly explain a social purpose because the current regulations do 
not distinguish a profit maximizing fund from this concept.129 Addi-
                                                                                                                      
 
Interview by Danone Communities with Xavier de Bayser, Chairman and Founder, IDEAM 
(Integral Development Asset Management) (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.danone 
communities.com/?p=156 (stating that Danone Communities is “a social-minded money 
market investment”). 
124 See  15 U.S.C. § 77j(a); id. § 80a–24; Securities and Exchange Commission, Registra-
tion Form for Open-end Management Investment Companies (Form N-1A), at 6, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf; Peter Fortune, Mutual Funds, Part I: 
Reshaping the American Financial System, New Eng. Econ. Rev., July–Aug. 1997, at 45, 45–50. 
Additionally, all funds, including mutual funds, must file Form N-8A to register. See Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Notification of Registration Filed Pursuant to Section 8(a) 
of Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form N-8A), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/formn-8a.pdf. 
125 Form N–1A, supra note 124, at 6; Fortune, supra note 124, at 50. 
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)–(f) (2006); Form N–1A, supra note 124, at 6. The prospectus 
“is a term of art referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an 
issuer or controlling shareholder.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). This prospectus must be in “plain English” so that there is no 
confusion or claimed misunderstanding. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2007); Warren E. Buffett, 
Preface to Office of Investor Educ. & Assistance, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Plain 
English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents 1–2 (1998) 
(stressing the importance of writing prospectuses so that investors, who usually do not 
have an accounting or finance background, can understand them). 
127 15 U.S.C. § 77j; id. § 80a–24; Form N-1A, supra note 124, at 6–8. The registration 
statement must also have a proper front and back cover page, fee table, shareholder in-
formation, how to purchase securities, repurchase information, financial highlights, and 
any additional information that the SEC has concluded is not necessary but may be help-
ful. Form N-1A, supra note 124, at 6–8. 
128 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1098 (2d Cir. 
1972); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j–77k. 
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b; Yunus, supra note 6, at 175, 178–79. For example, the statute 
could change by specifying that a social business must, “clearly state any social purpose 
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tionally, these guidelines must also explain how the fund would meas-
ure and report the social benefit, since the regulations now only refer 
to the reporting of a monetary profit.130 Thus, to facilitate the creation 
of new social mutual funds, more precise regulations in terms of a so-
cial business are necessary.131
B. Advantages for Corporations 
 A mutual fund model can encourage directors to form social busi-
nesses because it gives them confidence that this business model will 
stand up against shareholder suits.132 Additionally, this model removes 
any uncertainty in the ever-evolving field of corporate charitable law.133 
There would be no duty of loyalty or duty of care question because it 
would be clear from the outset, as in Google’s model, that there is only 
a social, not monetary purpose.134 To fulfill their duties, the directors of 
the fund will have a duty to be loyal to others besides their sharehold-
ers—to those who are receiving the social benefit—consequently elimi-
                                                                                                                      
with specificity in its prospectus. Additionally, the social investment fund prospectus must 
clearly lay out a process to report and measure these social results.” See 15 U.S.C. § 77j. 
130 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a–4 (explaining the types of investment companies, all of 
which are based on profit maximization); id. § 80a–29(b)(2) (stating that investment com-
panies must provide “copies of every periodic or interim report or similar communication 
containing financial statements”); id. § 80a–29(e) (requiring funds to provide semi-annual 
reports to stock holders on their finances); Rana, supra note 30, at 94 (discussing that 
measuring this social benefit is a potential issue for social businesses). As a result of social 
businesses, profit maximization is not the only way to measure business success. See Prasso, 
supra note 2, at 100. Currently, Yunus measures his micro-credit success not by dollars but 
by people who climb out of poverty. Interview with Muhammad Yunus, supra note 9. To 
measure its social benefit, Grameen Danone hired GAIN, a nutrition organization, and 
Johns Hopkins University to study the nutritional impact after the first year of the business. 
See Yunus, supra note 6, at 154; Interview by Danone Communities with Bérangère Ma-
garinos, Senior Manager, Investments & Partnerships, GAIN (Feb. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.danonecommunities.com/marketing-a-nutritional-product-in-a-poor-country-
the-gain-foundation%E2%80%99s-business-approach. This study is important to the com-
pany because the concrete health benefits for children demonstrate the success of invest-
ments. See Yunus, supra note 6, at 153–54. 
131 See Yunus, supra note 6, at 177–79. 
132 See id. at 171–72; Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
133 See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 81, at 968 (discussing “the uncertain legal environ-
ment of charitable contributions”); Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 82, at 1191 (explaining 
the problem with corporate philanthropy as “whether corporations do, or should have, the 
power, by management decision . . . to make philanthropic gifts”); cf. Prasso, supra note 2, 
at 100 (explaining that “money given for philanthropy is often misused”). This type of 
fund will also eliminate the possibility of a misuse of philanthropic donations because of 
reporting requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(29) (2006); Prasso, supra note 2, at 100. 
134 See Kerr, supra note 31, at 627–28; IPO Letter, supra note 107, at 32. 
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nating the uncertainty in this area of law.135 It will also allow directors to 
create a social business with no compromise to their original profit 
maximizing company.136 Therefore, they will not need to take any ac-
tion that may alienate investors, such as amending their charter.137
C. Advantages for Shareholders 
 The mutual fund model for social businesses will benefit share-
holders because it increases their choice.138 They will have the decision 
as to whether or not they want to invest in a social business at all.139 This 
enhanced choice influenced Danone’s decision to create a mutual 
fund.140 Additionally, if the fund provides options, the choice of 
whether to invest or not could give an investor a choice as to which type 
of social benefit to support.141 Typically, a director will make a decision 
on charitable contributions without any authorization from the share-
holders.142 However, shareholders, not corporations, are the individuals 
with morals and passions who will want to choose where their contribu-
tion is directed.143 The mutual fund model increases shareholder power 
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136 See Prasso, supra note 2, at 100; Interview with Emmanuel Faber, supra note 44. 
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139 See, e.g., Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 82, at 1198–209 (discussing the numerous 
benefits of shareholder choice within corporate philanthropy); Kahn, supra note 80, at 
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143 See Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 82, at 1205–06, 1208; Elhauge, supra note 80, at 
830–40. 
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and eliminates the typical corporate charitable contribution problem.144 
Shareholders will benefit from this model because they will be able to 
view the social progress and sustainability of the company through re-
quired reports, which do not exist for charitable contributions.145
Conclusion 
 Muhammad Yunus’s social business idea not only represents a 
unique development for charity and non-profit businesses but for the for-
profit corporations as well. This idea could have a significant effect on 
marginalized groups and completely redevelop the approach to the 
elimination of poverty because of its self-sustaining nature. Muhammad 
Yunus introduces this business model as an evolution of his microcredit 
success. Grameen Bank has expanded its experiment in social businesses 
with the creation of a number of partnerships for healthcare, eye care, 
and nutrition. The potential success of these programs is dependant 
upon the public and corporate interest in them. While Grameen Da-
none is still experimenting with the most cost-efficient way to produce 
yogurt and remain self-reliant, it will have two more factories in the near 
future.146 The companies, like Grameen Danone, that have taken the 
risk to create them serve as examples to the rest of the corporate com-
munity. 
 Other companies, however, have yet to embrace social businesses 
as a result of the unclear state of corporate law. For Yunus’s idea to be 
successful on a grand scale, there must be some kind of incentives or 
guidelines for their creation. If Groupe Danone’s mutual fund serves as 
a model for creation of a social business investment fund, these social 
businesses could be groundbreaking. Clear regulations to encourage 
the creation of not-for-profit social businesses must be enacted if social 
businesses are to have any chance to put poverty in museums.147
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